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1. Introduction 
The EU’s “unique” and “supranational” legal order is widely regarded among lawyers to be 
crucial to its policy successes. If the EU is to become a successful global actor, one would expect 
its foreign policy and external relations1 to be similarly built on supranational law. The legal 
aspects of the external relations of the European Union (EU) were indeed at the heart of the 
debates on changes to the EU’s constitutional structure in the Treaty of Lisbon. But, unlike 
other policy areas, foreign policy was not brought within the “supranational fold” by the Treaty 
text. On the contrary, the (then) UK Foreign Secretary characterised the position thus: 
Common foreign and security policy remains intergovernmental and in a 
separate treaty. Importantly … the European Court of Justice’s 
jurisdiction over substantive CFSP policy is clearly and expressly 
excluded. As agreed at Maastricht, the ECJ will continue to monitor the 
boundary between CFSP and other EU external action, such as 
development assistance. But the Lisbon treaty considerably improves 
the existing position by making it clear that CFSP cannot be affected by 
other EU policies. It ring-fences CFSP as a distinct, equal area of action.2 
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As a statement by a UK politician to his national parliamentary chamber, this statement 
places a political spin on a significant legal development made by the Treaty of Lisbon to the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and makes important assumptions about the 
development of the EU’s constitutional order. Through considering the legal changes to the 
CFSP and subsequent practices, this article examines the extent which the CFSP is “ring-fenced” 
from other aspects of EU competences which also cover external relations, and what this means 
for the legal dimensions of the EU’s capacity to act beyond its borders. In doing so, the article 
revisits fundamental questions about the nature and function of law within the CFSP and, in turn, 
its place in the EU’s constitutional order. The article critiques the “ring-fencing” metaphor and 
contends that it is only partly useful in explaining the role and place of the CFSP, since the 
foreign policy the EU has committed itself to forge is unlikely to rely on the CFSP, but rather the 
myriad of other competences under the Treaties. As there have been only a few instruments used 
post-Lisbon which rely on CFSP competences, current practice shows that the development of 
EU foreign policy largely occurs outside the formal scope of the CFSP.  Hence, the CFSP 
continues to serve as a political arena for the Member States seeking to prevent EU action on an 
issue of vital (national) importance and to show that Member States retain control over foreign 
policy, by pointing to the CFSP’s “ring-fenced” nature. Yet foreign policy cooperation does not 
end with the CFSP. Rather, the consequence is that the EU institutions find ways of putting 
external policies into action via an increasing set of legal instruments. The downside, at least for 
those proponents of a more obviously workable EU foreign policy, is that the CFSP is likely to 
remain characterised as a failure because, although it occupies the most obvious Treaty-based 
“heart” of the EU’s external relations, it is not the legal basis for practical policy-making.  
The article proceeds as follows: after setting out the CFSP’s position in the EU’s post-
Lisbon legal order, the article critiques the extent to which the “ring-fencing” is borne out in the 
text of the Treaty. Analysis of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and the Treaty-based loyalty 
clause suggests that the fence is not as secure as it may seem. The article then considers whether 
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the “ring-fencing” in practice stands up to scrutiny, with emphasis on Lisbon’s institutional 
innovations to ensure coherence and consistency, and contends that the practice is even further 
removed from the impression given in the text of the Treaty. The article concludes that the 
consequences for the CFSP are that will remain largely declaratory in nature and closer to a 
model of classic international law. If this means attempting to separate a policy-area from the 
“normal” methods of integration, then there are significant consequences for the future of EU 
law as we know it. 
2. The CFSP in the EU’s Post-Lisbon Legal Order: Reinforcing a Paradox? 
The CFSP would, to a casual observer unfamiliar with the complexity of the EU’s workings, lie 
at the central core of the EU’s external relations. Indeed, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
lays down the expansive provision that “The Union’s competence in matters of common foreign 
and security and security shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the 
Union’s security”.3 The provision was introduced in the very first version of the TEU 1992 as a 
means to strengthen the EU’s voice in international affairs to a level consummate with its 
growing economic weight. The CFSP codified informal practices and discussions on foreign 
policy affairs between the Member States dating back to the 1970s, but with grand statements in 
the Treaty about the EU’s aims that it has found difficult to live up to.4  
The revised provisions and post-Lisbon practice emphasise the EU coordinating its 
external competences in a more coherent fashion. Even if the scope of the CFSP has not 
changed drastically, the position of the CFSP (and the institutional competences in it) within the 
Treaty arrangements has been significantly altered. The CFSP is also listed as a separate Union 
competence in Article 2(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to 
distinguish it from other, “general” competences. This “otherness” of the CFSP within the 
constitutional order is expressed in the “ring-fencing” metaphor.  But it does not explain why the 
CFSP should be exceptional within the EU’s legal order. In one sense there is an obvious answer: 
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the tradition of “otherness” of the CFSP and legal expression of the Member States’ fear of the 
encroachment on their sovereignty if the Court of Justice was able to extend supranational EU 
legal principles to foreign policy. The Treaty seems to stem the “Brusselsization” of the CFSP 
where “the member states have in practice entered a slippery slope of integration with decision-
making competence “creeping” to Brussels”5 with the Court in Luxembourg filling in the gaps. 
But given that other areas have been “communitarianised” in the most recent Treaty, is the 
“ring-fence” likely to prove effective in keeping the CFSP separate from the rest of the EU’s 
legal order? If, as demonstrated below through a discussion of post-Lisbon practice, this is highly 
unlikely, what are the potential consequences for both the EU’s foreign policy and its 
constitutional/legal order?  
The CFSP embodies a deep paradox at its core, which has been exacerbated by Lisbon.  
The amendments point to a strong, value-led approach to external relations.6 Institutional 
innovations, notably the EU diplomatic service and Foreign Minister in all but name (the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) and the High Representative for Foreign and Security 
Policy), underline the importance of foreign affairs by attempting to improve institutional and 
representative “practical” capacities. And yet, the Treaty maintains the legal inadequacy of the 
instruments provided for in the Treaty in order to meet these aims and objectives. In this respect, 
the position of the CFSP in the constitutional order is the most obvious area where stated aims 
lack the legal structures to bring about effective “supranational” policies.  
3. The Legal Technicalities of Ring-Fencing the CFSP: Pre- and Post-
Lisbon Provisions 
The creation of the CFSP in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1992 led to the 
characterisation of the EU as formed by three “pillars”. As the second “pillar”, the CFSP was 
accorded alternative instruments and processes distinct from the familiar “first pillar” regulations 
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and directives and the “Community method”. Due to the lack of extensive role of the 
supranational institutions, it was characterised as a largely intergovernmental pillar and lacking in 
legal dynamics.7 The TEU also limited the Court’s jurisdiction by the former Article 46 TEU 
which did not list the CFSP provisions as being within the Court’s powers. This provision has 
been strengthened by Lisbon which mentions the Court specifically in the articles devoted to the 
CFSP.8 
Yet, despite its intergovernmental tag, the variety and multi-level institutional actors 
involved in the CFSP, complexity and unpredictability9 led to  an increasingly widespread view 
that as the CFSP was engaged in a process of “progressive supranationalism”, making its 
distinction from other areas of EU integration less clear-cut.10  
The “pillar” structure was abolished by Lisbon, and replaced reference to the Communities 
by references to the Union.  By granting explicit legal personality to the Union rather than simply 
the Communities, 11 the Treaty gives the impression that the TEU had brought the two 
intergovernmental pillars within the framework of the EU and, hence, placed the CFSP on the 
same footing as other, more integrated areas and ending its “otherness”. In reality, this move 
merely removed the strange situation where the Union relied on the legal personality enjoyed by 
the Communities to conclude international agreements and join, for example, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and formalised the existing consensus that the EU had already become an 
independent subject of international law.12 The abolition of the pillar structure did not mean the 
end of “intergovernmental” areas of EU policy.  
A related innovation in the attempt to bring together the CFSP and other externally-
focussed competences was a new TEU section on the need for consistency and coherence.13 
Article 23 TEU makes the CFSP subject to new, general provisions on the Union’s external 
action14  The three Treaty articles which govern the entirety of the CFSP and non-CFSP 
dimensions to the Union’s activities are wide in scope and give some indication to the values the 
EU holds dear, though only a few are aimed towards specific goals.15 
6	  
	  
The “specific provisions” applicable to the CFSP show that the former second pillar has 
not been fully flattened. Rather, the specific provisions contribute to the “ring-fencing” away 
from other law and policy-making areas. The Treaty retains but rewords the previous Article 47 
TEU (now Article 40 TEU), which states the CFSP specific provisions shall not affect the 
exercise of Union competences in Article 3-6 TFEU, essentially the former “Community” 
competences which include common commercial policy, 16  development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid17 and other areas which have an external dimension, including freedom, security 
and justice, environment and energy. The subtle, but important, change contained with the post-
Lisbon Article 40 is that, whilst the CFSP may not affect other competences, the reverse is also 
now the case, i.e. the use of regulations or directives in areas where the EU enjoys exclusive or 
shared competence with the Member States may not be used instead of the specific provisions of 
the CFSP. This provision is likely to result in inter-institutional disputes before the CJEU which 
will be required to ascertain where the centre of gravity of a measure lies.18  
The CFSP is the only area which applies to all Member States where “specific provisions” 
for decision-making apply.19 Unanimous voting in the Council remains the basis of the decision-
making process (Article 24(1) TEU) and, even when abstaining, a Member State “may qualify its 
abstention by making a formal declaration” (Article 31(1) TEU). The CFSP is alone within the 
Treaty therefore in retaining the “Luxembourg compromise”20 and permitting any Member State 
to free itself from the obligation to apply a CFSP decision, even though that decision will bind 
the EU.21 In an enlarged Union of 28 Member States, one need look no further than the 
retention of unanimity in CFSP decision-making to illustrate its “otherness” in the legal order 
and the associated difficulties in decision-making. In the report of Working Group VII on 
External Action under the European Convention, it was noted that: 
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It is quite a curious claim to make that outside actors may seek to take advantage of EU 
difference, since this could apply to any of the areas in which the EU operates, especially those 
which are “sensitive” in terms of national sovereignty but which have nevertheless witnessed a 
growing amount of EU competence. Therefore, the choices in the Treaty reflect the “super 
sensitive” nature of foreign policy with a built-in safeguard mechanism to ensure that any 
decisions have been agreed by one and all.  
The Treaty-based instruments were renamed by the Treaty of Lisbon 23  but remain 
deliberately separate from the more familiar instruments used elsewhere.24 Common strategies, 
created in Treaty of Amsterdam as a means of structuring EU action on areas of focus, remain 
unchanged, but in practice are hardly ever used. The EU has preferred to agree “strategic” 
documents which do not rely on a specific legal basis, including the European Security Strategy 
(2003) and Stabilisation and Association Process for South-East Europe.25 “Actions to be 
undertaken” and “positions to be taken” which are made on the basis of “decisions of the 
European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union” are adopted by 
qualified majority in the Council, 26  as an exception to the usual rule of unanimity. 27  For 
proponents of a less intergovernmental CFSP, this provision appeared to offer an opportunity 
for majority voting which could have developed into the “norm” of CFSP decision-making. 
Article 32 TEU points to the possibility of a “common approach” on CFSP matters which could 
therefore be used for a similar purpose. However, a Member State may block a decision taken by 
Some members ... expressed the opinion that foreign policy issues were 
not adapted to decision making by voting since it would be difficult for 
a Member State to find itself in a minority position on an issue in which 
precisely its national interests were at stake. Some pointed out that 
QMV in CFSP would also heighten third country awareness of internal 
EU disagreement, thus rendering CFSP less effective.22 
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qualified majority, if it conflicts with “important and stated reasons of national policy” (Article 
23(2)). This is one of the clearest factors contributing to the “ring-fenced” nature of the CFSP 
since such a provision allowing a national veto despite majority voting taking place is found 
nowhere else in the Treaty.28   
Significantly, no formal enforcement mechanisms are provided for in order to ensure 
Member State compliance. The lack of formal enforceability of the CFSP instruments leads some 
to conclude that they cannot be considered to be “legal” at all.29 Others have noted the “lowest 
common denominator” character of the CFSP instruments as they seek to accommodate the 
divergent interests of all the Member States,30 preventing even the type of enforceable minimum 
harmonisation found elsewhere in EU law. 
The CFSP instruments are not within the scope of Article 288 TFEU and the effectiveness 
of CFSP measures in national courts has been debated since the entry into force of the TEU.31 
That is not to say that “traditional” enforcement measures would necessarily be appropriate for 
use in the CFSP, as even the Commission recognises,32 but the lack of any enforcement 
mechanisms sets the provisions apart from the rest of the European integration process. To have 
no means of enforcing the provisions leaves a significant gap in the EU’s legal order unless the 
measures taken are the type which do not lend themselves to enforceability: but this would sit 
uncomfortably with the wide scope of the Treaty provisions. 
Taking the continuation of previous legal mechanisms surrounding the CFSP with newer 
initiatives emerging from Lisbon, at the formal level the text of the Treaty does indeed appear to 
“ring-fence” the CFSP away from mainstream EU law to a greater extent than was previously the 
case. However, three of the main innovations, or at least, more explicitly worded dispositions, 
require further analysis to discern whether the Treaty text does effectively “ring-fence” the CFSP. 
4. Testing the “Ring-Fence”  
i. Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the CJEU 
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The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the CJEU appears in the second paragraph of Article 24 
TEU.33  The previous, pre-Lisbon version of the TEU made no mention of the powers of the 
Court in the CFSP articles (Title V). Furthermore, the CFSP is further ring-fenced away from the 
reaches of the CJEU within the provisions dealing with powers of the CJEU, in Article 275 
TFEU.34  
 Taken together, there appear to be two fences protecting the CFSP from judicial 
supervision. Not only do the new provisions exclude review of the substance of CFSP measures, 
but they also eliminate any supervision over procedural irregularity, since the jurisdiction is limited 
to monitoring the competence boundaries or the legality of “restrictive measures”.35 It would not 
seem possible that Article 263 TFEU could be used to mount a judicial review challenge to the 
way in which a CFSP decision, even one concerning “restrictive measures” such as sanctions on 
an individual, was made. Neither (it seems) could the alternative judicial review process, via a 
preliminary reference from a national court, be used.36 Human rights challenges cannot engage 
the Court with regards to CFSP measures, even though EU foreign policy has already given rise 
to cases in the European Court of Human Rights37 and the Treaty foresees the eventual EU 
adhesion to the European Convention.38 Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
Union (on the right to an effective remedy) is difficult to square with the exclusion of the Court 
from CFSP matters, which could conceivably affect the legal rights of individual citizens.39 In its 
2012 judgment in Parliament v Council, the Court rejected an argument by the European 
Parliament that it would be contrary to EU law to adopt measures having a direct impact on the 
fundamental rights of individuals and groups which excluded the participation of the 
Parliament.40 The Court stated that the Charter binds all institutions (and therefore also when 
institutions are acting under the CFSP) but did not elaborate on Article 47 specifically.41 
The Treaty does foresee an exception when individual rights are at stake in Article 275 
TFEU, which now allows the Court to review decisions affecting rights of natural/legal persons 
(brought under Article 263 TFEU) but only in cases where restrictive measures are placed upon 
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them.42 In all other instances, even if an individual was able to satisfy the extremely high 
threshold of the standing requirements for a non-privileged applicant seeking judicial review of 
an act of the EU institutions, the Court would not have jurisdiction to hear the claim. The lack 
of jurisdiction to review CFSP measures characterises the policy firmly as an area of executive-
led, “high politics” in which it is assumed that individual rights are unaffected. 
Further, it is worth recalling that the CFSP covers all aspects of foreign policy and is not 
defined as merely a residual category. Comparisons with domestic systems of Member States also 
run into difficulty when bearing in mind the status of the Parliament, which has neither the 
legislative involvement in CFSP decisions, nor the ability to use its position to bring actions 
before the Court, even if dressed as procedural. Save for the exception in Article 275 TFEU 
relating to restrictive measures, the “rule of law” which the Treaty attaches to both its own 
system, and the values it purports to promote beyond its borders, is thus diminished and 
replaced by “a rule of the executive”.43 Article 75 TFEU, which involves the ordinary legislative 
procedure, allows for sanctions against individuals, within the setting of combating terrorism 
within the area of freedom, security and justice.44 Yet, under Article 215 TFEU, which is engaged 
when a decision has been taken under the CFSP, restrictive measures against third countries, or 
natural or legal persons, may be adopted by the Council acting alone. The Parliament’s attempt 
to challenge the use of Article 215 TFEU as a basis for sanctions, by claiming that it would be 
contrary to EU law to adopt measures capable of impinging directly on fundamental rights, was 
recently rejected by the CJEU in Parliament v Council since it would make Article 215 TFEU 
redundant. The Court did underline the general obligation (as per Article 51(1) of the Charter 
and Kadi)45 for all Union institutions to safeguard fundamental rights. Nonetheless, it is difficult 
to see from the decision in Parliament v Council what would be the case if the Court found that 




The discussion thus far in this part suggests that the ring-fences around the CFSP appear 
relatively secure. However, whilst it might be challenging to envisage a situation where individual 
rights are affected by a CFSP measure other than restrictive measures, it should not be forgotten 
that the Court in Kadi found a solution to a complex legal conundrum which expressly 
confirmed that fundamental rights are protected by a “constitutional guarantee stemming from 
the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by an international 
agreement”.46 It is not too much of a conceptual stretch to consider that the Court could refer to 
general principles of law and the protection of fundamental rights to engage in more substantive 
review of CFSP decisions and the continuation (as noted before Kadi case) of an “implicit or 
indirect jurisdiction” over the CFSP.47 
The ring-fencing of the CFSP has also cast some doubt on the principles established by 
the Court in pre-Lisbon CFSP case law. Prior to Lisbon, the EC Treaty enjoyed a superior place 
in the hierarchy between the two Treaties since the former Article 47 TEU prevented the TEU 
from affecting anything within the Community’s competences. This is no longer the case: revised 
Article 1 TEU states that two Treaties shall have equal legal value. The TEU’s original intent was 
to prevent intergovernmental pillars from having an effect on the more integrated, Community 
pillar, the CFSP can no longer be subservient to former Community competences. This casts 
some doubt on the continued validity of the Court’s view in ECOWAS,48 where the Court said 
that  “the Union cannot have recourse to a legal basis falling within the CFSP in order to adopt 
provisions which also fall within a competence conferred by the EC Treaty on the 
Community”.49 The new Treaty arrangements appear to counter the approach the Court adopted 
in ECOWAS which required CFSP joint actions to be implemented not only by means of other 
CFSP decisions but also by Community decisions and thus forging a “holistic” view of (external) 
competences. The Court rejected the UK’s submission in ECOWAS that the CFSP provisions 
were entirely separate.50 In the only post-Lisbon case to address this issue, Advocate-General Bot 
in Parliament v Council made an interesting and potentially far-reaching observation in referring to 
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the competences outside the CFSP “in which the European Union enjoys complete freedom”.51 
He also rejected the Council’s view that, in the case of the EU competences on combating 
terrorism via restrictive measures, the deciding factor on competence is “internal” v “external”.52 
Craig’s observation that “[T]he presumption that “normal” EU law should predominate is deeply 
ingrained in the judicial psyche and will not easily be shifted”53 is implicit in the views of AG Bot 
which suggest that the CFSP only operates in defined areas, notwithstanding the wide definition 
of CFSP and the general obligation on EU institutions to act within their respective competences.  
“Purely” political measures are difficult to isolate from the measures which can be taken 
under the competences of the EU. Therefore, it could be argued that any potential measure 
which covers interaction with the outside world could (or even should) be done under the CFSP, 
once again remembering that the CFSP covers “all areas” of foreign policy.54 The important 
word is therefore “all”. Concluding a purely economic agreement with a third state implies that 
foreign policy choices have been made to engage with that country.55 If this was the case before 
Lisbon, then it is even more pertinent now since there is no implication that the (former) Article 
11 TEU is nonetheless subservient to the principle that the EC Treaty takes precedence (former 
Article 47 TEU). Faced with a situation where the Court, as it is permitted to do so under the 
Treaty, examines the legal basis of a measure to decide whether it belongs under the CFSP 
(which is hence not susceptible to judicial review) and a non-CFSP measure (which would be 
susceptible) it would seem logical to assume that the Court would have a natural preference for a 
measure which can be justiciable. Its reasoning could be derived from the commitment to the 
rule of law or the preamble of the Treaty underlying the integration of the EU as the ultimate 
goal. Reference could also be made to the Member States doing all they could to meet the aims 
of the Union, as distinct from the loyalty clause. A close reading of Article 40 TEU would 
suggest that the parity of the two Treaties protects the acquis communautaire built up in the former 
first pillar which cannot be undone by relying on the CFSP as a legal basis since this would 
potentially breach Article 40 TEU. 56  
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Although one should be wary of predicting how the Court will use its discretion to police 
the boundary between the CFSP and other policies, there is little doubt that it will have the 
opportunity to do so, especially in cases similar to the post-Lisbon case of Parliament v Council and 
the assertion here is that the “ring-fencing” is unlikely to exclude the Court as it might appear 
from an isolated reading of the Treaty text.  
ii. The loyalty obligation 
The loyalty obligation is a distinct, but related, issue on the Court’s position vis-à-vis the CFSP. 
The obligation is expressed generally (since Lisbon, “the principle of sincere cooperation”) in 
Article 4(3) TEU, which has formed a crucial part of the Court’s reasoning in its development of 
the EU’s “supranational” legal order.57 For CFSP, the Treaty obliges Member States to comply 
with the Union’s actions and support the CFSP “actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty 
and mutual solidarity”.58 In addition, Article 32 TEU expanded the previous Article 16 TEU, the 
first paragraph of which requires a high level of consultation within the Council and “mutual 
solidarity”. Article 28(2) TEU states that decisions taken “commit the Member States in the 
positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity”, which can be considered a dimension 
of the obligation, albeit one which operates different to enforceable, Community-developed 
concepts.59  
Member States have become used to the interpretations by the CJEU on the duty of 
loyalty, including areas which fall within the sphere of external relations, albeit not explicitly on 
the CFSP.60 The Court of Justice has continued to develop, and extend, the doctrine to promote 
consistency of EU external relations, and the EU’s legal order.61 As Neframi has argued, the duty 
has shown both the potential and dynamics across the non-CFSP aspects of EU external 
dimensions for Member States to be bound by the Court of Justice’s interpretation of the 
Treaties. 62  The AETR/ERTA case63 established long ago the doctrine of implied external 
powers, a decision of high constitutional significance for the development of the EU’s external 
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relations across the board and one which found its basis in the duty of loyalty. 64  If 
AETR/ERTA was the first landmark, then Pupino65 is its natural successor in terms of using the 
loyalty principle as a springboard to ensuring legal effectiveness in the former third pillar. The 
Court stated that:  
Hence, the Court “found” a binding loyalty obligation on the basis of the need for 
effectiveness of EU law.  It thus prompted much discussion about whether this reasoning could 
be applied/extended to the CFSP too.67 The Court did not have an opportunity to do so, 
although on a case involving external relations, the Court found that Sweden breached the (then) 
Article 10 EC by acting unilaterally when a “concerted common strategy” existed at EU level and 
that, contrary to Sweden’s and others’ views, the duty is not limited in scope.68 The Court stated 
that it did not matter whether the area of competence under question was exclusive or shared, 
the important factor is whether a “situation is likely to compromise the principle of unity in the 
international representation of the Union and its Member States and weaken their negotiating 
power”.69 This is suggestive of a Pupino-style analogy and demonstrates that external relations are 
not beyond the limits of the Court’s view of the loyalty principle, but the question did not relate 
specifically to a CFSP measure and the refusal of a Member State to adhere to it. At the very 
least, however, the Court’s decision in Commission v Sweden points to the obligation on the 
Member States to remain “silent” on matters pertaining to foreign policy, even when the EU 
does not enjoy exclusive competence.70 
It would be difficult for the Union to carry out its tasks effectively if the 
principle of loyal cooperation, requiring in particular that Member States 
take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment of their obligations under European Union law, were not also 




Do the post-Lisbon provisions prevent a Pupino-style argument extending to the CFSP? 
The Italian and UK governments argued in Pupino that there was no loyalty clause which could 
be applied as Article 10 EC applied only in the Community pillar, but the CJEU found one on its 
own logic of interpreting the aims and scope of the Treaty and hence applying a definition which 
transcended the pillars. Reading across the dicta from the Court by analogy to the CFSP loyalty 
provision would, pre-Lisbon, have been a possibility, should the Court have had an opportunity. 
But, as examined in the previous section, the Treaty text appears to now prevent an opportunity 
for the CJEU to do. But even if the  “ring-fence” secures the CFSP from other policy areas on 
the substance, that is not necessarily the case for the loyalty provisions. Given that the loyalty 
provision applies across the EU’s legal order, loyalty cannot remain outside the CFSP. The 
problem for the Court, should it adopt this position, is the lack of jurisdiction: in other words, 
the Court would be able to extend the same characteristics of loyalty as it found in Pupino to the 
CFSP, but would need to circumvent the jurisdictional problem.  
The most conceivable way the Court might be able to take such a step would be to return 
to its boundary-policing function by resorting, as it did in Pupino, to “a (thin) textual argument as 
well as a more persuasive teleological one”.71 In this context, the Court could argue that it was 
not the substance of a CFSP measure but the competence at stake, and that (returning to the lack of 
hierarchy between the Treaties) that loyalty requires the more integrationist legal basis to be used. 
This scenario is most likely to arise in a situation where the Parliament claims that the CFSP 
provisions are being improperly used. However, it is possible that, especially in a case where 
individual rights are affected, a case could arise via the preliminary reference procedure from a 
national court. This prompts a further potential difficulty however since national courts would 
not be able to seek clarification on how to resolve a conflict between national law and a CFSP 
measure via this procedure and would therefore have to come to their own conclusions as to 
how to interpret the non-legislative character of the measure which nevertheless is said in the 
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Treaty to be subject to a loyalty clause. This is similar to Schütze’s characterisation of external 
competence restraint as a form of “reverse” subsidiarity.72 
Much here depends on whether situations arise where there is a doubt over competence, 
as in ECOWAS. The Parliament can be expected to be particularly vigilant in this regard and has 
already begun proceedings against a CFSP decision on an EU agreement with Mauritius on 
combating piracy, which the Parliament feels does not fall wholly within the CFSP.73 As the 
guardian of the Treaties, the Commission could be expected to also be vigilant but is in a more 
difficult position since the High Representative is a Vice-President of the Commission.  
Further, the loyalty clause in Pupino was “read across” from the EC Treaty (Article 10 EC): 
as Article 4(3) is now found in the TEU, and bearing in mind the collapse of the “pillar” system, 
there is a strong case to suggest that applies more directly to the CFSP. 74 In this context, 
therefore, even if not in others, the argument that the Lisbon text “ring-fences” CFSP away from 
the loyalty provision is a difficult one to make, especially if the CFSP provisions are used to get 
around other provisions where loyalty is much more firmly established. 
iii. The non-legislative character of the instruments  
The Treaty is now explicit that the instruments provided for under the CFSP cannot be 
considered “legislative”. 75 CFSP decisions are excluded from the Article 289(3) TFEU procedure, 
“Legal acts adopted by legislative procedure shall constitute legislative acts which means that 
Article 24 TEU leaves open the question of what legal effect(s) CFSP decisions may have. A 
distinction must be made between “legislative” and “legal” since the former refers to the process 
of creating an instrument rather than its (legal) force. Article 289(3) does not refer to legal acts 
which might be adopted outside the scope of the legislative procedure. 
This question of legal effects of the CFSP is not new, since the original TEU provisions 
was no clearer, only that that the instruments were distinct from regulations, directives and 
decisions.76 If the distinction between measures taken under the CFSP and the former first pillar 
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was the supposed political, intergovernmental nature of the former which do not lend 
themselves to the type of instruments which should be enforceable then this was surely buried 
by the Kadi decision.  
Whilst excluding the possibility of creating legislative acts, this should not be taken to 
mean “non-binding” or “non-legal”,77 particularly since they may indeed affect the legal rights of 
natural or legal persons.78 The best characterisation remains Curtin’s pre-Lisbon analysis of CFSP 
instruments as examples of “binding non-legislation”.79 After all, the Treaty does refer to the 
binding nature of the CFSP and, referring back to the Pupino decision, it was this type of 
provision that led the Court of Justice to find that the obligation could be read across. The lack 
of explicit mention of the principles of direct effect and supremacy/primacy in the Treaty and to 
which aspects of EU law it applies does not help discover whether there is a possibility of these 
principles applying to the CFSP.  
If the Court of Justice could find that, despite the wording of Article 24 TEU, the 
characteristics of a decision taken under the CFSP was able to have the same legal effects, then 
this is potentially significant in the choice of legal basis for measures. The ECOWAS case80 
demonstrated the extent to which the choice of legal basis for a particular measure is important, 
but complex. This is especially the case when there are multiple objectives pursued in a measure 
and the “high politics” cannot be easily separated from the economic.81 
Since the Treaties now have equal weight, this analysis leads back to the same argument 
about how the CFSP might be used in the future. If it is used only when a measure cannot be 
taken under another, non-CFSP legal basis then the legal situation will remain the status quo. But 
if the non-legislative CFSP decisions begin to be used instead then the Parliament in particular 
will make its voice heard through the judicial review procedure. Although unsuccessful, the 
Parliament has already demonstrated its will in this regard in its action against the Council, and 
invoked the democratic principles cited in the Treaty.82 The Court would then be faced with a 
choice of putting aside its previous jurisprudence and what the Treaty used to say about the 
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Treaty hierarchy, or find some inventive way of keeping the CFSP free of measures which 
could/should be found elsewhere. In short, the Court could conceivably be called upon to judge 
whether a decision taken under the CFSP should rather be a decision under non-CFSP Article 
288 TFEU.83 To do so would therefore circumvent the apparent lack of legislative qualities of 
CFSP instruments. 
5. Post-Lisbon Practice in the CFSP 
The obvious starting point in examining post-Lisbon practice is the use of the instruments, 
which have been used very sparingly since the entry into force of Lisbon. The majority of the 
decisions taken under the CFSP since the Treaty are related to imposition of restrictive measures 
on third states or third parties. The principal exceptions are the Decisions on humanitarian 
assistance in Libya84 and reform of the security sector in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.85 Therefore, the impression given by the Treaty that legislative acts are excluded since 
they are not needed or applicable to the domain of “high politics” is not borne out in practice. 
Despite the lack of use of the CFSP instruments at their disposal, calls by Member States 
for the CFSP to take on a fully legislative character are few and far between. The Report by the 
“Group of Europe” of 11 Member State foreign ministers in their future-oriented plan for 
Europe in September 201286 listed as a priority, after resolving the euro crisis, strengthening the 
EU’s act on the world stage. However, it did not call specifically for legislation in CFSP but 
rather majority voting in decisions. The Report also noted the need to reduce the ability of a single 
Member State to block decisions but also to “develop the concept of constructive abstention”.87 
What this tells us is that even the Member States who most favour integration as a means to 
make the EU work better, stop short of including the CFSP wholeheartedly within the 
integration process. That is not necessarily to say that these Member States are immune to the 
prospect of greater cooperation, or even supranationalism, but that the institutional focus 
19	  
	  
remains on the Council, where is not just the Member States but the executives of the Member 
States which hold the reins.  
The quotation at the outset suggests that the CFSP is subservient to the will of the 
Member States acting in a collective manner and completely separately from the other areas of 
EU integration where the ‘supranational” institutions are allowed to act. But if this was the case, 
then the CFSP would not be an “equal area of action” but should take priority over all other 
externally-focussed areas. The practice shows that this is not the case. Rather, than the CFSP 
serves a function for action on matters which fall within the CFSP as a residual category. If this 
were not the case, then there would be little achieved by inserting provisions which apply across 
the EU’s external actions nor insisting on the need for coherency and consistency in external 
relations. Even then, the perspective of the CFSP as being “intergovernmental” is not only out-
dated but misleading because it stresses that the Member States are the only significant actors in 
it and that anything which concerns the world beyond the borders of the EU must take place 
within CFSP. The critique of the “ring-fencing” does not, as would seem as first glance, 
demonstrate that a claim (official or otherwise) that the CFSP is more intergovernmental since 
Lisbon is justifiable in practice. 
 That the EU needs to act more coherently in external relations is almost universally 
agreed, even if the extent to which the EU should have a global role (and with what powers) is 
not. The “face” of a more coherent CFSP is, according to the Treaty, the High Representative 
for CFSP: a role which was downgraded from the proposal in the Constitutional Treaty for a 
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. Though modelled on an executive conception of foreign 
policy, the title was changed as part of the jettisoning of constitutional/state-like features of the 
Treaty. Nevertheless, the development of the pre-Lisbon post of High Representative who 
functioned as Secretary General of the Council merits consideration, since the new institutional 
arrangements do not bear out a CFSP which is effectively ring-fenced from other policy areas. 
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 There are two reasons for this. The first is that the High Representative, inheriting her 
role from the pre-Lisbon High Representative who was only a servant of the Council, is also a 
Commission Vice-President. This innovation is indicative of the porous nature of the 
institutional arrangements which is designed to promote coherence of action, but does not 
reflect the decision-making structure of the CFSP as laid down in the Treaties.88The Commission 
is therefore to be more involved in the CFSP than the “specific provisions” would suggest. This 
is a strong element of the requirement of consistency, but also a paradox when it comes to ring-
fencing: the High Representative is presumed to keep separate the respective roles and to be 
vigilant when matters discussed in the Commission pertaining to non-CFSP areas do not 
impinge on competences which should be within the CFSP. The “double-hatted” High 
Representative is somehow expected to wear different intergovernmental/supranational hats 
depending on the circumstances. The post of High Representative does not constitute an EU 
institution in itself, although Article 18 TEU lists the post besides the other institutions, and thus 
the Treaty leaves room open to institutional practice to define where the fence lies.89 The 
effectiveness of the CFSP ring-fencing is brought into question by the High Representative 
herself, who in her own words states that, “my first impressions for the 18 months are that this 
[role of High Representative] is a huge role, created without deputies and created on paper 
without any reference to look back on of a description of how it would actually be in practice”90 
or indeed “like flying a plane while you are still building the wings and somebody might be trying 
to take the tail off at the same time”.91 This is partly as a result of the way in which CFSP came 
into the reform process, which was not because of difficulties in the way in which the High 
Representative’s role worked but to enable institutional oversight over the drive for coherence 
which emerged during the reform process.92 As such, neither the theory nor practice of this 
institutional innovation supports the ring-fencing of the CFSP. 
 The second is the development of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Article 
27(3) TEU defines the role of the EEAS to assist the High Representative and the principle of 
21	  
	  
staffing it by officials drawn from the Council and Commission, and seconded from Member 
States,93 This was a dramatic departure from the previous practice of external representation of 
the EU in third countries through Commission delegations and cooperation between 
EU/Member State officials without being physically situated in the same building. The Council 
Decision establishing the EEAS94 requires all staff (which is to include a “meaningful” presence 
of nationals from all Member States95) to act only in the interests of the EU.96 The role of the 
EEAS is to assist in the fulfilment of the mandate relating to CFSP and other external 
competences belonging to the Commission and Council97 and to help the High Representative 
“ensure overall political coordination of the Union’s external action, ensuring the unity, 
consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s external action”.98  
Although the Council Decision establishing the EEAS was based on a CFSP provision 
(Article 27(3) TEU), it appears from the procedural aspects of the way it was adopted that its 
nature and scope are not limited to the CFSP only.99 In particular, the EEAS is not the servant of 
the Council but an “inter-institutional service” and subject to influence exerted on it by the 
Commission too.100 Here again, we see a holistic view of EU external relations being carried out 
in a way which should not fall foul of the EU’s (internal) institutional divisions. But the 
institutional arrangements do not support the carrying out of EU external relations according to 
a strict separation of CFSP from non-CFSP matters. Despite the delicate “balancing act” 
reflected in the Council Decision which founded the EEAS between the institutional conduct of 
CFSP versus other external relations,101 in reality there are few conceptual or practical lines which 
can be drawn between what is (or should be) CFSP or not. In particular, whilst approximately 
one-third of the staff of the EEAS should be drawn from the diplomatic services of all the 
Member States,102 the Council Decision does not imply that the work of the staff should be 
divided across CFSP and non-CFSP lines. Indeed, this would practically be impossible in most 
cases given the wide definition of CFSP aims but policies existing under other competences. 
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Whether the influence of the “intergovernmental” CFSP within the conduct of external 
relations by the High Representative permeates other policies, or vice versa, will be evident over 
time and will depend on a variety of factors (including the working culture of the section of the 
EEAS, the delegation in a third country or the nature of the relationship with the third country 
or issue under question). Since all EEAS staff are required to work in the interests of the EU, 
this suggests a sidelining of the CFSP given the extensive external assistance instruments in place 
in relation to many third countries.103 Previous work on socialisation of officials working in 
European institutions, including pre-Lisbon CFSP, suggests that CFSP is already much less 
“intergovernmental” than this term allows104 and given the longevity of cooperation already 
existing within the institutions on foreign policy, has already evolved into something akin to 
law.105 
The role of the Commission goes beyond the High Representative herself. It would be 
futile to suggest that, even before Lisbon, the Commission was wholly divorced from the 
workings of the CFSP. Indeed, as former External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten has 
himself said, a great deal of his time was devoted to the CFSP.106 If the ring-fencing in the Treaty 
was supposed to limit the supranational influence of the Commission as well as the Court of 
Justice and the Parliament, then this is a message which has not reached the Commission itself. 
Indeed, since the entry of the force of the Treaty of Lisbon, a new inter-institutional agreement 
between the European Parliament and the Commission foresees the involvement of the former 
by the latter in the CFSP: “Within its competences, the Commission shall take measures to better 
involve Parliament in such a way as to take Parliament’s views into account as far as possible in 
the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy” 107 
If the Commission was intended to play no role in the post-Lisbon CFSP, then this 
provision would be meaningless. Rather, it is demonstrative of the Commission’s informal role 
in the CFSP and the inadequacy of the Treaty provisions to account for or reflect what actually 
occurs in the CFSP or external relations more generally. A similar point has been raised in 
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relation to the European Parliament, which has more indirect influence over the institutional 
workings of the CFSP than commonly assumed.108 These observations are closely linked to the 
need for coherence, which in itself implies unitary action, despite the legal “fences” put in place. 
It does not seem likely that the Court is seen as a more supranational “threat” than the 
Commission. Rather, it can be said that the Commission is uniquely able to promote the 
coherence of EU external relations since it is responsible for the non-CFSP Common 
Commercial Policy.  At the one level, CFSP should concern “political” foreign policy issues 
which are not, or cannot be, dealt with via binding legal measures. But this distinction has been 
shown to be unworkable before Lisbon. Post-Lisbon, with the requirement to ensure consistency, 
is the CFSP be reduced to “purely” political issues which are ring-fenced? As stated above, under 
the previous arrangements, if there was a doubt over which legal basis a measure should be 
based upon, then the general answer was clear.109 But add to this the increasing number of 
examples of where “cross-pillar” policies took place, such as the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, which have transcended the formal divisions in the Treaties and which the High 
Representative (for CFSP) emphasises as a priority area. Given the requirement for consistency 
in the Treaty, it seems likely that, should the EU continue to seek for coherent policies towards 
third countries/regions/issues, wide-ranging policies which are not simply based on one 
particular legal basis will become the norm.  
This point is supported by an analysis of the decisions which have been taken under the 
CFSP since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Despite the all-encompassing foreign 
affairs the Treaty is supposed to cover, in fact the vast majority of outputs from the CFSP are 
concerned with economic sanctions on third states and individuals. The Kadi situation would still 
arise, since it affects legal rights of third parties. Furthermore, Article 215 TFEU puts in place 
measures agreed under “general” policy of CFSP.110 The two logical conclusions to draw from 
this observation are that (again, given the wide-ranging nature of the CFSP provisions) EU 
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foreign policy is redundant, or that it is alive and well, but the instruments under CFSP are not 
being used. The contention here is that it is the latter.  
Ring-fencing risks effectively restricting the CFSP’s scope to a “nucleus” of purely 
“political” measures. If so, there are two potential consequences. First, that the CFSP could be 
used for a general agreement on a (possibly) high-profile international issue on which the 
Member States are agreed and which to announce their common view to the world. This would 
provide a springboard to further actions taken under other EU competences, and would reflect 
the line of reasoning from Parliament v Council.111 Second, the CFSP would, with the exception of 
the sanctions measures, continue to become even more declaratory in nature, meaning that 
decisions taken under CFSP would simply give an indication as to the level of agreement existing 
between the Member States on a certain issue. But the problem with this assertion is that it 
suggests that a neat distinction exists between “high politics” and “low politics”, which is 
superficial.112 If it was the case that the Member States had pooled aspects of foreign policy such 
as recognition of new states, then the CFSP could be used in this way. But as recent examples 
show, the declaration of independence of South Sudan, or the recognition of the Libyan or 
Syrian rebel forces as the legitimate governments of those countries, Member States have not 
taken the opportunity collectively. An alternative, which recalls Lavenex’s “concentric circles” of 
EU external governance, is that the CFSP is retained for measures on the very outer limit of 
what Member States are prepared to commit themselves..113 Parliament v Council 114 can be read as 
supporting the view that CFSP is simply there to ‘scope” general aims and then flesh out the 
actions via other competences: “The Council also maintains that it does not follow from the fact 
that listed persons and entities may now bring an action for the annulment of decisions taken in 
the sphere of the CFSP imposing restrictive measures on them that any amendment to an 
existing regulation must necessarily be preceded by the adoption of a new CFSP decision”.115 
And yet, the argument of the CFSP being at the centre of foreign policy from which 
other initiatives flow does not support this proposition. According to the High Representative, 
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the foreign policy “core” is provided by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and 
“recognising the importance of the bilateral connections that we have” in strategic partnerships 
with the USA, Russia, China, India, Brazil or South Africa.116 In evidence given to the House of 
Lords EU Select Committee, the High Representative does not even mention the CFSP.117 
Rather, the “priority” relationships are not defined by CFSP instruments and the lack of use of 
common strategies pre- and post-Lisbon suggest that Member States do not foresee the use of 
CFSP in this way. Therefore, if these core relationships and their legal bases are found elsewhere, 
then the ring-fencing does not suggest that the CFSP occupies a “higher” place in the legal 
hierarchy from which initiatives may flow. There has been no call for a re-evaluation of existing 
external policies on the grounds of their legal basis. If Member States are responsible for ring-
fencing the CFSP in this way, and assuming that the UK is the ‘sceptical” benchmark for any 
integration of foreign policy, then the UK’s enthusiasm for EU-led external initiatives such as an 
EU-US free trade agreement118 means that a link between the ring-fenced CFSP and all other 
areas is not what was intended. Rather, the non-CFSP competences will continue to develop of 
their own accord whilst the CFSP is left as a residual character: something which is not entirely 
reflected in the words of the Treaty.  
 The reasoning set out above leads to a conclusion that the practice of the CFSP, beyond 
sanctions, remains declaratory in nature. “Declaratory” is a criticism that has been levelled at the 
CFSP since its creation, and whilst declarations may have some foreign policy impact, it is 
curious that these are the hallmark of the policy, instead of the instruments which have been 
specifically created for its use. The extent to which non-CFSP measures are used already suggests 
that actions and policies toward third countries or issues are there but not badged as such under 
the CFSP. The ENP is good example of this, as a document issued jointly by the Commission 
and High Representative notes that CFSP engagement “will continue to be part and parcel of the 
ENP”119 and the roadmaps of actions to take within the framework of the ENP do not mention 
the use of CFSP instruments.120 This seems to be at odds with Article 29 TEU which suggests 
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that the Union’s approach to a particular geographical or thematic issue will be taken via a CFSP 
decision, and Article 40 TEU. A better way to explain the ring-fencing with reference to the 
Member States is rather than to suggest that they are immune to foreign policy cooperation (or 
even/rather integration) but that the CFSP can remain declaratory but free of “legalism”. This is 
also suggestive of a continued development of EU external relations which does not depend on 
Treaty changes as a catalyst but incremental, institutional development.121 Taken together, these 
observations place the CFSP in a category of executive actions for which a Court (here, the 
Court of Justice) would be unable to find any binding characteristics. The immunity of foreign 
policy from judicial control is reflected in the national constitutional arrangements of Member 
States. A strong argument against democratic oversight would be that there is no (legal) 
substance to a purely political policy area and the previous sections in this article have 
demonstrated that strictly separating what is or should be CFSP or not is, at best, extremely 
difficult and liable to focus attention on internal divisions with the EU rather than the 
coordinated, common foreign policy the CFSP is designed to further. 
Another consequence of a declaratory CFSP is that in terms of both legal certainty and 
meeting the aims of the Treaty, the use of the CFSP provisions itself is only going to have a 
marginal effect on the development of EU foreign policy. This is also regrettable because the 
two “new” features within the Treaty relating to foreign policy (coherence and the promotion of 
values) suggest that the EU is going to be measured according to these as well as its general 
capacity for forge a common policy. The focus of attention is likely to remain on what is being 
done under the CFSP rather than anything else. By attempting to ring-fencing the CFSP in this 
way, in a way which appears theoretically possible but practically unworkable, the CFSP itself 
risks being marginalised to the extent that even the High Representative, when characterising the 
priorities of European foreign policy, does not seem to identify it as a means by which EU 




Major EU treaty negotiations have become ever more cumbersome, complex and time-
consuming as the political demands of Member States translate into legal provisions which make 
the EU constitutional animal an even stranger beast. No more so is this the case than for the 
CFSP. The reforms brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon do two conflicting things: 
strengthening the visibility and capabilities of the EU to act on the international plane in a more 
consistent and coherent manner, whilst also at least purporting to set clearer institutional lines 
which cannot be crossed, but which, if they could be crossed, would be an integral part of 
helping the EU achieve its goals based on the EU’s experience in other areas. If the provisions of 
the CFSP can be characterised as more “political” than “legal”, then this suggests that the 
intention of the Treaty of Lisbon reforms is to ring-fence the CFSP to the most sensitive areas in 
terms of state sovereignty. This has a dual function; on the one hand, those Member States 
concerned with selling the Treaty to (sceptical) domestic populations could point to the ring-
fencing as a form of protection of national sovereignty away from the integrationist EU 
institutions. On the other hand, it allows the competences of the rest of the Treaty provisions to 
be used for the actual conduct of the EU’s external relations. This article has also shown that 
rather than the CFSP being the starting point for EU policy towards a thematic or geographical 
issue in external relations, in practice it is unlikely to be used as such for initiatives in foreign 
policy which can then be followed up by using other Treaty competences.  
“Ring-fencing” to ensure that the Member States are the only significant actors on key 
areas from which all else follows is not borne out in the institutional practices permitted (or even 
promoted) under the Treaty. In the “real” exercise of the EU’s external action, a more complex 
picture emerges. From a strict rule of law perspective, one might consider that this frustrates the 
aims of the drafters of the Treaty since the letter of the law is not being obeyed if the CFSP 
instruments are ignored in favour of measures found elsewhere to pursue what should be CFSP 
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goals. From the perspective of consistency and coherency of EU external action, this practice 
might be a welcome development in terms of satisfying the general goals of the Treaty. As a 
result, the boundaries between CFSP and other areas are likely to continue to provide a fertile 
ground for analysis by legal scholars, who, like the Court of Justice, must at the same time unpick 
the political reasoning behind the paradox of a “ring-fenced” CFSP which is more porous than 
would seem. To fully understand where the law in CFSP is, scholars must continue to look 
beyond the Treaty-based instruments and see where the goals are fulfilled via other means. 
However, the implications for the nature and role(s) of law in relation to the EU more 
generally are not limited to arguments based on competences. Rather, the position of the CFSP 
in the EU’s Treaty arrangements and attempt to “ring-fence” is indicative of an attempt to 
further remove this policy area from the influence of what has become “normal” in EU law and 
what is known to be effective in making the law work across so many different Member States. 
The Treaty’s reforms tell us that there is a fear of EU law applying to this area beyond almost all 
others and that the possibilities for further integration by law in this area may have passed. The 
reticence to allow, within the text of the Treaty, the supranational institutions to carry out the 
work they have done in areas of European integration seen as most successful (such as the 
internal market), pushes the CFSP back towards the realm of classic international law. The 
problem of doing so, as is well known, is that decision-making processes and the decisive action 
on world affairs so frequently called for, is unlikely to be forthcoming within this type of legal 
framework. 
Since some Member States publicly support the greater use of majority voting in CFSP 
(though not necessarily the extension of the “normal” legislative decision-making process), it 
might be thought possible that CFSP becomes part of a “multi-speed” or differentiated pattern 
of integration where certain Member States integrate further. But insofar as the CFSP represents 
the view of the Union as an emerging international actor, it is surely in a different situation than 
a policy-making area which applies only internally within the EU. The overall effectiveness 
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argument, whilst certainly present whenever “multi-speed” Europe is discussed, is more 
significant in the CFSP since its raison d’être is to enable the EU (and not only a part of it) to be a 
more effective global actor and therefore its significance relies on the unity and collective weight 
of all its Member States. The consequence for the EU’s legal order is that it would be difficult to 
see how the aims of consistency and coherence could be met with differentiated patterns of 
integration in this area, and hence possibly other areas too. 
Conversely, in the wider debates about what the EU should be, how far (and in what areas) 
it should integrate and what type of “law” is fit for purpose, “ring-fencing” other areas might 
prove attractive to Member States seeking to “repatriate” powers away from the supranational 
institutions. This might conceivable be in the areas of freedom, security and justice; migration 
(especially insofar as third country nationals are concerned) or even the internal market. If this 
does occur, then it may be that the traditional method of legal integration via regulations and 
directives loses ground to a model of EU law where Member States “ring-fence” certain areas. 
The result would be a fragmentation of the EU’s legal order and calling into question of one of 
the most fundamental dimensions of the “new legal order” which has been at the core of the 
integration process. 
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1 A note on terminology: “external relations” is the preferred term when speaking of the EU’s 
relationships and policies beyond its borders. “Foreign policy” is generally only applied to 
analysis of the CFSP. The Treaty of Lisbon introduces “external action” as an umbrella term 
covering both external relations and foreign policy. In this article, references are deliberately 
made to external action, external relations and foreign policy as appropriate. 
2 Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (David Miliband), HC Deb 20 
February 2008 c378. Emphasis added. 
3 Article 24 (1) TEU. 
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4 The earliest and most widely cited statement relating to this is that of C Hill and his “capability-
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